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CONGRESS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
AND THE PATH OF REAPPORTIONMENT
LITIGATION
Michael E. Solimine†
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr unleashed the
Reapportionment Revolution, which was largely driven by litigation
in the lower federal courts, with periodic additional guidance by the
Court. That litigation continues to the present day, revived every
decade by new census data and further complicated by the demands
of the Voting Rights Act and other factors. Less appreciated has been
the role of Congress and the president in influencing that litigation.
Baker was initially quite controversial in some circles, and that
hostility was manifested by bills introduced in Congress that would
have restricted the impact of the case. But the bills did not pass, the
opposition soon receded, and Baker came to be supported by most
policymakers and the public. In 1976 Congress abolished the much
criticized three-judge district court, but demonstrated its support for
Baker by expressly leaving it intact as a forum for the litigation of
reapportionment cases. The reasons for that decision are not clear,
but one appears to be to reduce the pressures on one judge in such
politically charged cases by making three judges responsible.
Likewise, the president, through amicus curiae briefs filed by
Solicitor General Archibald Cox, supported the result in Baker and
influenced the doctrinal development of subsequent reapportionment
† B.A., Wright State University (1978); J.D., Northwestern University (1981). Donald P.
Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. An earlier version of this
Article was presented at the Symposium on Baker v. Carr After 50 Years: Appraising the
Reapportionment Revolution, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by
the Case Western Reserve Law Review, Nov. 4, 2011. I thank Michael Dimino, Jon Entin, Rick
Hasen, Mark McKenzie, Ryan Owens, Rich Saphire, and Dan Tokaji, for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft; Ross Gillingham for excellent research assistance; and the support
of the Schott Fund.
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cases. Those briefs also appear to have provided political support for
federal court intrusion on apportionment matters previously left to
state politics. This article addresses the consequences of these actions
by Congress and the president on federal court reapportionment
cases since Baker and situates that interbranch interaction in the
academic literature focusing on the institutional context and
aftermath of Supreme Court decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Baker v. Carr1 held that federal courts could hear suits challenging
the legality of malapportioned state legislatures under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, the decision
is firmly in the lauded canon of landmark Supreme Court decisions,
and the “one person, one vote” principle it inaugurated for the
apportionment of legislative bodies is now so well accepted that
contemporary writers find it “hard to imagine what all the
constitutional fuss was about.”2 The standard version of the reception
of Baker is that it was almost immediately popular among elites and
the general public, in sharp contrast to other important decisions of
the Warren Court. The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims3 and other
cases fleshed out the “one person, one vote” standard, and it was
implemented quickly by litigation in the lower federal courts and state
courts in over half the states.4 Opposition in Congress and elsewhere,
such as it was, soon melted away, and Baker was well accepted by
virtually everyone in only a few years.5 In subsequent decades the
Supreme Court, and lower courts, struggled with whether and how to
apply Baker and its progeny to more complicated and contentious
issues like politically or racially gerrymandered districts, so litigation
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 297 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
3 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4
See Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 320–22 (discussing how eager states
were for reapportionment, as proven by thirty-four of them beginning litigation against state
legislature apportionment schemes within nine months of the Baker ruling).
5 For the accepted story on the aftermath of Baker, see, for example, B ARRY FRIEDMAN,
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 268–70 (2009) (noting that an angry Congress
shoved aside all other business to deal with the Court’s ruling in Baker); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 126–27 (2006) (discussing
the predictability of Congress’ reaction following the Baker and Reynolds decisions, which was
an attempt by the House of Representatives to overturn it by constitutional amendment); Tara
Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 901–
02 n.177 (2011) (stating that in 1964 William Tuck, a Virginia Democrat introduced a measure
in the House of Representatives to “eliminate federal jurisdiction over reapportionment cases,”
but the Senate rejected the measure).
1
2
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under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) began to dominate
reapportionment cases.6 But the core principle of “one person, one
vote,” having its genesis in Baker, appears unscathed.
This version of the aftermath of Baker is accurate as far as it goes,
but the premise of this Article is that the story is a richer and more
complicated one. In particular, my goal is to unpack the notion that
the reapportionment decisions were relatively uncontroversial at the
time and later. The full story of the reaction to Baker is beyond the
scope of the present Article,7 but I will focus on how the other
branches of the federal government interacted with the Court at the
time of the decision and reacted to Baker in the 1960s, 1970s, and
later. The congressional and presidential reaction to Baker will place
Baker in a broader context, and explain how those branches affect
reapportionment litigation to the present day.
Before addressing how the other branches confronted Baker and
subsequent cases, Part II of the Article considers how the apparent
emerging scholarly consensus that the Supreme Court, more often
than not, is a majoritarian institution, pertains to the reapportionment
cases. Is Baker rightly understood as an example of the majoritarian
thesis? To what extent did Baker, then and now, reflect and garner
support among interested publics? Part II turns to the Executive
Branch’s interaction with Baker and subsequent cases and begins with
Solicitor General (“SG”) Cox’s amicus curiae brief filed in the case,
which supported the result reached by the majority. The consensus is
that the brief played a role, and perhaps a crucial one, in the result
reached and the eventual widespread support for reapportionment.8
Part II also addresses how the SG filed amicus briefs in subsequent
reapportionment and other election law cases and the apparent
influence of those filings on the Court.
Part III addresses Congress’s reaction to Baker. Congress’s initial
reaction was hostile as Congress introduced bills to overturn or limit
the impact of the decision.9 This hostility, however, faded away
quickly, and subsequent congressional actions can be seen as
6 See ANTHONY A. PEACOCK, DECONSTRUCTING THE REPUBLIC: VOTING RIGHTS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE FOUNDERS’ REPUBLICANISM RECONSIDERED 41–42 (2008)
(discussing how Baker v. Carr and the reapportionment cases, together with the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and litigation thereunder, opened contentious and ongoing debates over the
structures and functions of many aspects of the American electoral system).
7 For useful histories of Baker and the reaction to it, see generally STEPHEN
ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008); Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra
note 2; RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES (1970); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR.,
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968).
8
See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
9
ROSEN, supra note 5, at 126–27.
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supportive of the decision.10 Baker and other reapportionment cases
were initiated in three-judge district courts, with direct appeals to the
Supreme Court.11 Likewise, the VRA required some states with a
history of discriminatory election laws, mostly in the South, to clear
changes to those laws with the Attorney General or a three-judge
district court in the District of Columbia, with direct appeals to the
Court. That provision remains intact.12 Congress repealed the threejudge district court for other cases in 1976, but expressly left it intact
for reapportionment cases. Part III considers how the congressional
adoption of that specialized forum for the adjudication of these cases
can be seen, in part, as special solicitude for, and even protection of,
the federal judges adjudicating these cases. Part IV concludes the
Article.
I. BAKER V. CARR AND THE MAJORITARIAN THESIS
Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School famously argued that
judicial review of the actions of federal and state governments should
be limited since it was, as he saw it, counter-majoritarian in nature.13
Whether in fact Supreme Court decisions, and decisions of lower
courts, are on the whole properly characterized that way has been the
subject of extended academic debate. For example, Barry Friedman
has recently argued that most Supreme Court decisions over time are
properly regarded as being majoritarian and generally reflecting the
wishes of and being supported by the American public.14 To consider
how the debaters treat Baker v. Carr is instructive.
Friedman begins by briefly summarizing the doctrinal
developments before and after Baker.15 Sixteen years prior to Baker,
the Court had held, in a plurality opinion by Justice Felix
Frankfurther, in the factually similar case of Colegrove v. Green,16
that the dangers of courts entering a “political thicket” precluded
judicial review of legislative malapportionment.17 Baker, in a majority
opinion by Justice William Brennan, distinguished Colegrove,
holding that such suits did not involve nonjusticiable political
questions, since judicially manageable standards could be fashioned
10

See infra notes 116–137 and accompanying text.
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
12
See sources cited infra note 145.
13 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
14 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5.
15 Id. at 267–68.
16 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
17 Id. at 556. Colegrove was a challenge based on the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST., art.
IV, § 4, but the Court held the challenge to be nonjusticiable. 328 U.S. at 556.
11

2012]

THE PATH OF REAPPORTIONMENT LITIGATION

1113

under the Equal Protection Clause.18 Justice Frankfurter (joined by
Justice John M. Harlan) dissented vigorously and at length.
Frankfurter argued, among other things, that holding such cases to be
justiciable was a sharp break from precedent (i.e., Colegrove) and
historical practice and would involve federal courts in “political
entanglements” better left for resolution to the elected branches of
government.19 Frankfurter predicted that such entanglements would
lessen public confidence in the Court and that state legislatures would
resist implementation.20 Cases following Baker established and
applied the one-person, one-vote principle, requiring the redrawing of
many districts for state legislatures and districts of the U.S. House of
Representatives within states.21
Friedman observes that many federal and state legislators had been
elected in districts that clearly violated the one-person, one-vote
principle, so opposition from those incumbents was predictable. Bills
were introduced in Congress to limit Baker, while a coalition of the
states, representing state governments, also proposed constitutional
amendments to limit the impact of the decision. Some academics,
such as Bickel, also criticized the decision and predicted that
compliance would be lengthy and difficult.22 But the opposition soon
faded and the critics were proven wrong. Compliance “was
remarkably quick,” since litigation in lower federal and state courts
was soon initiated and orders requiring the redrawing of districts
promptly followed.23 Friedman concludes that the “public loved these
decisions. . . . Academics could whine about the decisions, and
legislators could grumble as they were reapportioned out of a job, but
the Supreme Court had read its public well: frustration over the issue
had been building in the body politic for a long time.”24
It does not denigrate Friedman’s lively and insightful account of
Baker and its aftermath to question whether the case fits so neatly into
the majoritarian model. Critics of that model have raised a number of
concerns about the theory and application of the model as a whole
and to particular cases. For example, when a court decision is said to
369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 267–68.
21 For a full doctrinal discussion of Colegrove, Baker, and Baker’s progeny, see M ICHAEL
DIMINO, BRADLEY SMITH & MICHAEL SOLIMINE, VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 107–
224 (2010).
22 FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 268–69.
23 Id. at 269.
24 Id. Friedman also points out that the dysfunctions of gerrymandering had been reported
in the popular press in the period up to Baker and that the Kennedy administration had
supported the plaintiffs in Baker when the SG filed an amicus brief. Id. at 270.
18
19
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represent or reflect the majority view, does that mean a pre-existing
majority, a later one, or one formed or informed by the decision
itself?25 Likewise, is evidence of a majority taken from public opinion
polls, other national political institutions (i.e., Congress or the
president), state and local governments, interest groups, or some
combination of the above?26 The majoritarian model also does not
often make clear how life-tenured federal judges are affected or
influenced by pressure from these majorities.27
Consider how some of these concerns can be applied to the story
of Baker v. Carr. The reapportionment decisions with their popular
support are often contrasted to other, far more controversial decisions
of the Warren Court.28 But Baker also shared characteristics with its
counter-majoritarian cousins. While Baker dealt with a legislature in
Tennessee that had not reapportioned in over fifty years, leading to
differences in the population of urban and rural electoral districts, not
all states were similarly passive. Indeed, it can be said that in many
states “the electorate supported malapportionment.”29 Prior to 1962,
in at least ten states, the public voted on initiatives that would have
reapportioned legislatures to reflect changes in population, and all but
one failed.30 Whether or not due to the results of an initiative, in 1962
virtually all state legislatures were malapportioned and violated the
upcoming one-person, one-vote standard.31 To be sure, it cannot be
said that many in the general public, directly or through their elected
representatives, supported overtly malapportioned legislative bodies.
Indeed, it is often observed that prior to Baker, the self-interest of
25 Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 116. Pildes argues that the “lack of a precise definition of the relevant majority
enables majoritarians to claim that almost any decision of the Court reflects majoritarian views,
since there is almost always some ‘majority’ to which one can appeal in asserting that the
Court’s decisions reflect ‘majority’ views.” Id.
26 Id. at 119.
27 Id. at 126–39; Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the
Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010).
28 E.g.,
CORTNER, supra note 7, at 256–65 (contrasting implementation of
reapportionment and school desegregation decisions); FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 267
(contrasting decisions striking down mandatory public school prayer with reapportionment
decisions); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections
on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1122 n.98 (2002)
(contrasting the public support for Baker with the controversy surrounding Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
29 Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 305.
30 Id. One study of these initiatives attributes their defeat not to “competing normative
theories of representation but, rather, simple political self-interest.” Jonathan Woon, Direct
Democracy and the Selection of Representative Institutions: Voter Support for Apportionment
Initiatives, 1924–62, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 167, 183 (2007). That is, voting was largely
determined on whether particular counties would gain or lose seats in the legislature under the
redistricting called for by the initiative. Id.
31 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 3.
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incumbent state legislators led to their passivity in not redrawing
electoral lines without the mandate of a court. But it can be said
Baker shattered the status quo on apportionment, which suggests that
it did not simply codify the views of the majority of the American
public.32
The upheaval of Baker is also reflected in the views of then
prominent academic critics. The aforementioned Alexander Bickel
was foremost among those critics. Not long after Baker was decided,
Bickel lamented that the decision would lead to a one-size-fits-all
solution for the apportionment of legislative districts. In a “diverse,
federated country,” he argued, states should be free to decide to draw
districts that reflect not only equality of individual votes, but other
values he considered rational, such as maintaining representation of
political parties or particular geographic areas.33 Bickel was not alone
in criticizing Baker on the basis that it would lead to endless litigation
and (as Frankfurter argued) would improperly involve federal courts
in the purportedly highly political enterprise of drawing district
lines.34 More recent and even sympathetic academics do not
necessarily absolve Baker of all sins. Leading scholars have
persuasively argued that Baker and the subsequent one-person, onevote rule are difficult to defend as proper constitutional interpretation
on textual or originalist grounds. When the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, it was difficult to argue that the drafters, ratifiers, or
general public thought that the Equal Protection Clause would outlaw
the then malapportioned legislatures.35 And the text of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments can be understood to forbid official
discrimination against the voting rights of African Americans, but
leave intact other inequality in the allocation of voting rights.36 Some
years later, Baker and the one-person, one-vote principle were
32 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at
262 (2009) (“The Court’s entry into the political thicket was awesome. . . .”).
33 Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 40, 42–
43 (1962).
34 See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 167–68 (summarizing views of
academic critics of Baker); FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 269 (summarizing views of academic
critics of Baker).
35 ROSEN, supra note 5, at 125–26; David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1260.
36 ROSEN, supra note 5, at 126; Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Looking for a Few Good
Philosopher Kings: Political Gerrymandering as a Question of Institutional Competence, 43
CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1171–72 (2011); Strauss, supra note 35, at 1260–61 & n.58. These writers
typically rely on Justice Harlan’s opinions in some of the reapportionment cases, e.g., Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–91 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting), while acknowledging that some
scholars have taken issue with Harlan’s views, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965
SUP. CT. REV., at 33, 85.
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embraced by most of the legal academy when they were defended by
John Hart Ely as an example of his influential representationreinforcing normative defense of constitutional review. He argued
that the Court is right to step in and strike down laws that limit public
participation in the political process.37 The reapportionment decisions
under this theory are best seen as judicial intervention to make an
arguably nonmajoritarian political system more majoritarian.38
My point here is not to deny that Baker came to be approved by
almost all of the public (however we measure that term) or by most of
the interested elites.39 Fifty years later, Baker and the one-person,
37

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74

(1980).
38 Id. at 120–24. For further discussion of Ely’s influence on the academic view of the
reapportionment decisions, see Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of
Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 288–89 (2010); Pamela S. Karlan,
John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329,
1333–34 (2005); compare STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 44–45 (2008) (arguing that a cadre of
younger liberal law professors in the 1960s and 1970s, like Ely, mobilized to defend in
scholarship the egalitarian decisions of the Warren Court, including Baker v. Carr). It is difficult
but not impossible to find modern scholars skeptical, at least to some degree, of the
reapportionment cases. See, e.g., PEACOCK, supra note 6, at 3–5 (summarizing wide-ranging
criticism of reapportionment and VRA cases on the basis that, among other things, the right to
an equal vote found in the former cases is in tension with the right to equal and effective
representation found in the latter cases); ROSEN, supra note 5, at 127–29 (discussing how the
one-person, one-vote principle “opened up a series of unanswered questions,” including the
permissible amount of deviation from that principle and did not eliminate and even facilitated
political gerrymandering); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes
and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 106 (2000) (arguing that
reapportionment cases are better grounded in the Guarantee Clause, rather than the Equal
Protection Clause).
39 Most, but not all. It is worth noting that some influential conservative legal voices
remained critical of the reapportionment decisions many years later. For one example, Robert
Bork in 1990 criticized the cases for their “egalitarianism and . . . disregard for the
Constitution.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 84 (1990). While the one-person, one-vote principle, stated in the abstract, “sounds
admirable,” in his view, it was not admirable to force it “upon people who have chosen
democratically to arrange their state governments in part upon a different principle.” Id. Bork
continues that he is not opposed as such to the one-person, one-vote principle, but argues,
echoing the dissents in Baker, Reynolds, and other cases, that the Equal Protection Clause was
not a principled basis to judicially superintend the drawing of district lines by state legislatures,
and that is was not irrational or unconstitutional for states to “want to provide representation for
people in certain localities, perhaps because they had distinctive economic interests or social
views that might be overlooked in a purely majoritarian legislature.” Id. at 86–87. Another
example would be Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. While applying for a position
with the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel during the Reagan Administration,
Alito submitted a letter in which he discussed his interest in legal issues and volunteered his
opposition to some Warren Court decisions, including the reapportionment cases. This criticism
came up frequently in his confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 687
(2006) (“It is difficult to imagine in this day and age any serious objection to the rights
identified in [Baker and subsequent reapportionment] cases.”) (statement of Samuel Issacharoff,
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one-vote principle seem to be well accepted by the general public,
even if their knowledge of redistricting in general is not deeply
informed.40 Rather, I am suggesting that the usual assertions that the
reapportionment decisions were quickly accepted are basically true,
but understate the counter-majoritarian (in all senses of that term)
nature of the decision, and some of the initial opposition to the
decisions. In other words, the decision was not inevitable and, like
any controversial decision, was contingent on any number of factors.
For that reason, it is useful to reexamine how the other branches of
the federal government were involved in the adjudication of, and
reacted to, the reapportionment cases. Executive involvement and
congressional opposition (and then a lack thereof) played a significant
role in shaping and implementing the law of reapportionment
declared by the Court. The next parts of this Article address the role
of the other branches in the reapportionment revolution.
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL SAFEGUARDS OF BAKER V. CARR
Throughout American history, the executive branch has sought to
influence the composition and decision making of the Supreme Court,
and the lower federal courts, in myriad ways.41 Regarding the

Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University). In his testimony, Alito stated,
notwithstanding his earlier views (informed in part by his reading Bickel’s work in college, id.
at 519–20), that he fully accepted the reapportionment cases, id. at 380, and explained his
previous criticism as based not so much on the principle of one-person, one-vote, but rather on
its arguably overly strict application in cases like Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983),
which struck down a districting plan in New Jersey, Alito’s home state. Id. at 381–84, 501–02.
See also PEACOCK, supra note 6, at 1 (arguing that “no serious discussion of the
reapportionment cases took place during the confirmation hearings [on Alito’s Supreme Court
nomination]”). A final example might be Justice Clarence Thomas, whose concurring opinion in
the VRA case of Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891–946 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring), argued that section 2 of the VRA should not be construed to cover vote dilution
claims. In the course of that opinion, he favorably referred to Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in
Baker v. Carr, id. at 896–97, indirectly suggesting that he (and perhaps Justice Scalia, who
joined the opinion) might be willing to revisit the correctness of that case and of the one-person,
one-vote principle. See Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108
HARV. L. REV. 109, 120 n.82 (1994) (making this point).
40 See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 133, 151 (1980)
(discussing public opinions polls from the 1960s on the reapportionment cases); CORTNER,
supra note 7, at 237 n.57 (same). For more recent polls indicating support for the one-person,
one-vote principle, see Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily,
Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting, 9 ELECTION L.J. 325, 325 & n.2 (2010).
41 See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (2007) (focusing on the relationship between the executive and judicial
branches); Mark C. Miller, The Interactions Between the Federal Courts and the Other
Branches, in EXPLORING JUDICIAL POLITICS 274 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2009) (exploring the
interactions between the courts and the two other branches of government); Jeb Barnes,
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Supreme Court, the most obvious method is presidential
appointments. Another way to influence decision making,
increasingly used in the past half-century, is through amicus curiae
briefs filed by the SG in Supreme Court cases where the United States
is not a party. In the 1950s, the Supreme Court modified its rules to
make the filing of amicus briefs easier, and the SG (unlike other
parties) is permitted to file such a brief without the permission of the
Court or of the parties to a particular case, at both the certiorari and
merits stages of a case.42 Since then, the SG has taken the opportunity
to file many such briefs, especially (though not only) in high-profile
cases. The professionalism of the SG and the perceived high quality
of the SG’s amicus briefs have apparently come to be seen by the
Court itself as a useful and objective source of information for the
Court, so much so that the SG is sometimes referred to as the Tenth
Justice.43 Similarly, the SG and the Administration he or she
represents have not been shy about advocating, via amicus briefs, the
policy objectives of that particular administration.44
Thus, the SG’s amicus activity has both an objective and an
advocatory component, though how that plays out in the decision to
file an amicus brief, and the position advocated in that brief, has
depended on the sometimes different and shifting policy goals of

Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on the Role of Courts in American
Politics and Policy Making, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 25 (2007) (reviewing studies that explore
the interaction of the branches of government).
42 EUGENE GRESSMAN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 512–17, 734–35 (9th ed.
2007); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 761–67 (2000). The relative ease of filing amicus briefs
in the Supreme Court, and the justices’ frequent reliance on those briefs, has not been without
controversy. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–37 (2011) (discussing whether judicial reliance on amicus
briefs is consistent with the adversarial system).
43 LINCOLN C APLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1987). The “Tenth Justice” analogy has been a matter of dispute, on both descriptive and
normative grounds. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development
of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 62 (1998); Adam D. Chandler,
Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or a Zealous Advocate?,
121 YALE L.J. 725 (2011).
44 See Barbara L. Graham, Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The
Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953–2002, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 253 (2003) (empirical study
of SG’s amicus briefs filed in civil rights cases in the Supreme Court); Stephen S. Meinhold &
Steven A. Shull, Policy Congruence Between the President and the Solicitor General, 51 POL.
RES. Q. 527 (1998) (discussing ways of measuring how SG advances the president’s policy
agenda); Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75
IND. L.J. 1297, 1306–15 (2000) (discussing SG’s amicus briefs filed in important civil rights
cases in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations); James L. Copper, Note, The
Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675 (1990) (empirical study of
SG’s amicus filings in different historical periods).

2012]

THE PATH OF REAPPORTIONMENT LITIGATION

1119

particular presidents and SGs.45 The Court, no matter its ideological
composition or that of the executive, appears to place significant
weight on the views of the SG. The Court sometimes requests the
views of the SG, via amicus brief, on whether the Court should grant
review in a case where the United States is not a party.46 Overall, the
SG has participated as amicus on the merits in up to thirty or more
cases in recent Terms, no small matter given the shrunken docket of
the Court since the early 1990s.47 The SG’s amicus briefs seemingly
have been especially influential on the Court as a whole and on
individual justices, as reflected in the high rate of agreement between
the Court’s decisions and the SG’s positions and the frequent citation
of such briefs in the Court’s opinions.48 The success of the SG as
amicus has been variously attributed to the expertise and experience
of the SG’s office, the ideological confluence of the respective policy
positions of the SG and of the Court in a particular case, and the
strategic behavior of the justices, seeking political cover regarding the
anticipated reaction to a decision by another branch of government.49
45 See Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., Amicus Curiae or Amicus Praesidentis? Reexamining the
Role of the Solicitor General in Filing Amici, 89 JUDICATURE 317, 321–322 (2006) (positing
that amicus activity “var[ies] across a number of dimensions” and that while “[s]ome cases will
likely reflect direct presidential influence,” other “cases will inspire presidential indifference”
and accordingly reflect more closely the positions of the SG). See generally RICHARD L.
PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE STRUCTURING
OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION 11 (2003) (engaging in a study of
the manner in which the solicitor general balances law and politics); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 1 (1992) (recounting the manner in which “the
work of the nation's lawyer . . . serve[s] as an integral component of executive policy making”).
46 Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the
Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35 (2010); David C. Thompson & Melanie
F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call
for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237,
242 (2009).
47 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1353–60 (2010) (discussing
the SG’s amicus activity in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). For a general overview of the
Court’s shrunken docket in recent decades, see Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining
the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).
48 See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. Q. 765 (2011) (empirical study of the influence of SG
amicus brief at the certiorari stage); Rebecca E. Deen et al., The Solicitor General as Amicus
1953–2000: How Influential?, 87 JUDICATURE 60 (2003) (documenting success rates of SG’s
amicus briefs in merits cases); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 760 (stating that the Court
cited SG amicus brief in 40 percent of cases in which such a brief was filed, the highest citation
rate of amicus briefs filed by frequent institutional litigants).
49 See PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 104–06, 180–82 (2008)
(addressing ideological confluence, institutional deference, and professional expertise as
explanations for success of the SG as amicus in the Supreme Court); Michael A. Bailey et al.,
Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72 (2005) (same); Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why
the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1566–68
(2010) (arguing that the Court is usually only concerned with elite opinion, and often obtains

95

1120

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:4

A. The Solicitor General as Amicus in the Early Reapportionment
Cases
How the SG has participated in the reapportionment cases provides
a useful case study of the advocacy of the Executive branch and its
effect upon the Judicial branch. The SG in the Truman administration
got off to a slow start by not participating in Colegrove v. Green,
which had challenged the apportionment of congressional districts in
Illinois.50 But the Eisenhower administration, which had notably filed
an amicus brief supporting desegregation in Brown v. Board of
Education,51 showed more interest in election law cases, which
culminated in Baker. The SG filed an amicus brief in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot52 supporting a challenge to a gerrymander of the boundaries
of the city of Tuskegee in Alabama. The Supreme Court unanimously
held the gerrymander to be unconstitutional because it was meant to
restrict the rights of African American voters.53
At the same time Gomillion was being argued and decided, the SG
in the outgoing Eisenhower administration and officials in the
incoming Kennedy Administration were closely following the Baker
litigation in the lower courts.54 Indeed, the plaintiffs in Baker lobbied
officials in the Eisenhower administration to intervene on their side as
an amicus in the case, in part due to the purported political advantages
to Republicans that might accrue in the case.55 The Kennedy
administration showed an even greater interest in the case, due in part
to the personal interest of the new president, and of his brother

such opinion through amicus briefs); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic
Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
(discussing strategic model); Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends From the Crowd: Amicus
Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 197–202 (2009) (arguing that
amicus participation increases the legitimacy of the Court by providing affected groups the
ability to apparently participate in the decision-making process).
50 328 U.S. 549, 550 (1946). Late in the Truman administration the SG filed an amicus
brief in a case challenging the Georgia county unit system of apportionment, but that
unsuccessful challenge culminated in a per curiam dismissal by the Supreme Court. Cox v.
Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (per curiam); see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 76–77 (discussing
Solicitor General Philip Perlman’s intervention as amicus curiae in Cox v. Peters). The Georgia
system was later struck down in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
51 347 U.S. 483, 485 (1954). For a discussion of the SG’s amicus brief in Brown, see
Waxman, supra note 44, at 1307–08.
52 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
53 Id. at 347–348. For a discussion of Gomillion and the SG’s brief, see CORTNER, supra
note 7, at 84–86. The Gomillion Court did not cite the SG’s brief.
54
Id. at 89.
55 Id. at 77–78. The argument was made that the case presented an opportunity for the
administration to “identify itself with the popular rights of people,” and that urban voters
represented by the plaintiffs might appreciate the help of Republicans. Id. at 77.
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Robert, the attorney general.56 The new administration concluded, not
surprisingly, that the many malapportioned state legislatures worked
mainly to the benefit of GOP-leaning rural voters, so victory for
plaintiffs in Baker would inure to the benefit of Democratic-leaning
urban voters.57
Eventually the Kennedy administration filed amicus briefs
recommending that the Court note probable jurisdiction of the direct
appeal by the plaintiffs from the adverse decision of the three-judge
district court and supporting the plaintiffs on the merits.58 Despite the
interest of his superiors, the new Solicitor General, Archibald Cox of
Harvard Law School, was reluctant to file an amicus brief that backed
the plaintiffs in sweeping terms.59 His doubts were due, in part, to
having been mentored by then-Professor Frankfurter at Harvard and
also due to Cox’s genuine uncertainty about recommending that
federal courts intervene in reapportionment cases.60 Eventually he
filed a brief that narrowly argued that federal courts had jurisdiction
to hear reapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause
(thus distinguishing Colegrove) and avoided addressing how federal
courts should order reapportionment.61
The majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, ruled
for the plaintiffs on the relatively narrow ground that federal courts
had jurisdiction over such claims, which were not barred by the
political question doctrine.62 Justices Clark, Douglas, and Stewart
filed opinions concurring with the majority, while Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan dissented.63 The majority opinion thus mirrored many of
56

Id. at 84.
See id. (observing that Senator John F. Kennedy had written an article in the New York
Times Magazine in 1958 critical of malapportionment); ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note
7, at 4–6, 128–29 (discussing lobbying of the new administration on this issue); CORTNER,
supra note 7, at 89–91 (same); Bruce J. Terris, Attorney General Kennedy Versus Solicitor
General Cox: The Formulation of the Federal Government’s Position in the Reapportionment
Cases, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 335, 337 (2007) (discussing presumed political interests of the
Administration).
58
Terris, supra note 57, at 337.
59
Id.
60
See id. (stating that Cox had “deep-seated doubt” about using the courts to solve the
malapportionment issue); ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 133 (stating that
Frankfurter was a mentor to Cox).
61 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 133–39 (discussing brief and oral
argument by Cox in Baker); CORTNER, supra note 7, at 103–16 (same). One contemporary
observer noted that after the second oral argument in Baker, Cox, after enduring sharp
questioning from Frankfurter in the oral argument, whispered that “Felix Frankfurter is right.”
Terris, supra note 57, at 337.
62
369 U.S. 186, 237 (1961).
63
Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 265
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
57
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the arguments pressed by Cox. There was, and is, widespread belief
that the justices in the majority were heavily influenced by the SG,64
and indeed subsequent accounts of the internal deliberations of the
justices in Baker seem to confirm that influence.65 That said, there is
no explicit reference to the SG’s amicus brief in any of the opinions.
A citation to or discussion of the SG’s amicus briefs in Court
opinions is a reasonable proxy for measuring the influence of such a
brief, but it should be used with caution. The justices might be
influenced by the brief and not mention it in an opinion, and similarly
a stray citation of the brief in the opinion might be the work of an
overzealous law clerk and not demonstrate any particular influence.
The Court might reach a particular result anyway, whether or not
advocated by the SG, or anyone else.66
However much the SG’s brief in Baker was influential, the
Kennedy administration continued to pay close attention to the
subsequent reapportionment cases. President Kennedy publicly
praised the decision,67 and his brother the attorney general took the
rare step of arguing for the United States as amicus in the next
important case, Gray v. Sanders, which involved a challenge to the
Georgia county-unit system for Democratic primaries in which
certain counties were given certain designated votes, which
discriminated against the more populous counties. 68 The Court struck
down the system, for the first time explicitly employing the “one

64 See, e.g., ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 144–45, 151 (arguing that SG’s
arguments influenced the discussions of the justices after the second oral argument and the
drafting of the majority opinion); DIXON, supra note 7, at 177 (noting that the SG’s amicus
briefs and participation in oral arguments in the reapportionment cases “tended to shape the
Court’s perception of the issues and indeed to dominate the litigation at certain stages”); Terris,
supra note 57, at 341 (noting that the Department of Justice assumed that the amicus brief had
“greatly influenced” the decision); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”:
Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 588–89 (2005) (discussing how the Kennedy administration
encouraged the Court to intervene in legislative apportionment, to overcome entrenched
interests which favored malapportioned legislatures).
65 See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 844–51 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (several
justices referred to the SG’s position in conference discussions on Baker); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT 413–14 (1983) (same).
But see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 184–91
(2010) (extensively discussing Brennan’s drafting of the Baker opinion with no mention of the
SG’s amicus brief).
66 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 767–87 (discussing citations to, adoptions of
arguments in, and other measures of influence of amicus briefs on the Court).
67 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 146–47; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 204 (2000).
68 372 U.S. 368, 370 (1963).
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person, one vote” rationale.69 This time only Justice Harlan in dissent
briefly mentioned the SG’s amicus brief.70
Despite the success of the SG’s amicus filings in Baker and Gray,
Cox remained ambivalent about aggressively pushing the one-person,
one-vote rationale with its attendant consequence of federal courts
inevitably striking down the districting of many state legislatures. His
ambivalence did not prove noteworthy in Wesberry v. Sanders,71
where the Court struck down the malapportioned districts in Georgia
for the U.S. House of Representatives, on the ground that the power
delegated to states in Article I, section 2 of the Constitution required
that states draw such districts to comply with the one-person, onevote principle. The SG filed an amicus brief simply calling for a
remand for a resolution on the merits, the lower court having
dismissed the case on political question grounds, and there was no
mention of the brief in the Court’s opinion.72
In 1964, the Court finally directly confronted a challenge to state
legislative districts in Reynolds v. Sims73 and five companion cases,74
and there the Court required that those districts comply with the oneperson, one-vote principle. The SG filed an amicus brief that applied
to all six cases,75 but there was vigorous debate within the Department
of Justice on the arguments to be made.76 Cox was reluctant to argue
that application of a strict one-person, one-vote principle was
constitutionally demanded.77 He was particularly troubled by the
argument that both houses of a state legislature must conform to that
principle (when both chambers of the federal legislature did not),78
and by the fact that in the case from Colorado, the voters had
approved by referendum the malapportioned districts.79 After much
discussion, Cox drafted the amicus brief, and while not arguing for
strict application of the principle, the brief did argue that
Id. at 381.
Id. at 383 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the SG’s amicus filing in Gray
and RFK’s argument, see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 192–93; Terris, supra note 57, at 338–39.
71 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
72 For discussion of the SG’s amicus opinion in Wesberry, see CORTNER, supra note 7, at
226; Terris, supra note 57, at 339–40.
73 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
74 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v.
Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S.
695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
75
ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER supra note 7, at 171.
76
Helen J. Knowles, May It Please the Court? The Solicitor General’s Not-So-“Special”
Relationship: Archibald Cox and the 1963–1964 Reapportionment Cases, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
279, 283 (2006).
77
Id. at 291.
78
ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 170.
79
CORTNER, supra note 7, at 215.
69
70
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malapportionment that led to “gross inequalities” among voters, and
which was based on irrational reasons should not be permitted.80 The
Court majority found for the plaintiffs in all of the cases and did
strictly apply the one-person, one-vote rationale.81 Given that the
Court was essentially rejecting the milder position advanced by the
SG, it is not surprising that the only reference to the SG’s amicus
brief in the opinions is one in a dissenting opinion.82
The conventional wisdom is that the SG’s amicus briefs had a
significant influence on the decision making of the justices in the
reapportionment cases from 1960 to 1964. But the available evidence
for this proposition is mixed. The Court followed the advice of the
brief in some instances, but not in others. If influence there was, it
was not much reflected in citations to or discussion of the briefs in the
opinions, and it is not clear if the Court would have reached the same
results even in the absence of briefing by the SG. On the other hand, a
deeper investigation of the drafting of these opinions and their
political context and aftermath might shed greater light on the
influence of the SG’s brief. A full exploration of those factors is
beyond the scope of the present article. However, Part IV of this
Article will consider congressional reaction to the reapportionment
cases, and the eventual muted reaction to the decisions by that body
may have been due, in part, to the support generally given the
decisions by the president and the SG.
B. The Solicitor General as Amicus in the Later Reapportionment and
Other Election Law Cases
A fuller appreciation for the SG’s role as amicus in the Supreme
Court can be gained by examining the filing of such briefs and the
Court’s apparent use of the briefs, in the reapportionment, VRA, and
other election law cases decided since 1964. Richard Hasen has
compiled a list of such cases from 1901 to 2009,83 and I determined
80 See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 172–74 (discussing the SG’s approach
in the consolidated cases). See also CORTNER, supra note 7, at 215–17 (same); Knowles, supra
note 76, at 279 (discussing drafting of the SG’s amicus brief).
81 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
82 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 7–60 n.16 (1964)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
83 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 166–75 (2003) (listing cases from 1900 to
2000); Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001–2010: A
Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 332–33 (2011)
(listing cases from 2001 to 2010). I added a case decided in 2011, Arizona Free Enterprise Club
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). In many of the cases listed by Hasen, the United States or a
federal agency (e.g., the Federal Election Commission) was a party, so the SG was already
representing a party and did not have the option to file an amicus brief. My examination was
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which of those cases from 1960 to the present the SG had filed an
amicus brief, whether the Court majority agreed with the position
taken by the SG, and whether one or more opinions in a particular
case cited or discussed the SG’s amicus brief. The results are
compiled in the Appendix to this Article.84
First, consider some overall trends found in that data. From 1960
to 2011, the SG filed amicus briefs in fifty election law cases, out of
189 cases in which the United States (or an agency thereof) was not a
party.85 The Court agreed with the positions advanced in thirty-four of
those briefs, an impressive record of congruence matched by that
found in all of the cases in which the SG files an amicus brief.86 One
or more opinions cited or discussed the SG’s amicus brief in twentyeight of the cases, an even higher rate than that found for the SG’s
amicus briefs in all cases.87
The SG filed amicus briefs in several of the post–1964
reapportionment cases that considered various issues on the
application of the one-person, one-vote principle.88 Most of the cases
were decided in the 1960s and 1970s, since the one-person, one-vote
principle came to be fairly settled by that point. In contrast, by the late
1960s, cases under the VRA, and those brought under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments with regard to the effect on redistricting
on African Americans (and other minorities) came to occupy much of
the Court’s agenda.89 The SG filed amicus briefs in a number of the

limited to those cases in which the SG did not represent a party, and had discretion to participate
as an amicus.
84
See infra p. 41.
85 As the Appendix indicates, I counted one case when the Court rendered two or more
decisions on similar issues on the same day (e.g., Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases),
since the SG typically filed one amicus brief for all of those decisions, when a brief was filed at
all. By examining each SG amicus brief, I also determined whether the Court had previously
called for the views of the SG (i.e., CVSG). See supra note 46. Some studies of SG amicus
activity exclude cases where there was a CVSG, since “such invitations are most appropriately
viewed as mandatory filings and therefore not subject to the SG’s discretion.” Chris Nicholson
& Paul M. Collins, Jr., The Solicitor General’s Amicus Curiae Strategies in the Supreme Court,
36 AM. POL. RES. 382, 396 (2008) (citation omitted). Only 7 of the 50 cases in the present study
were determined to have a CVSG, and that relatively small number did not justify excluding
those cases. There have been fewer CVSGs in recent years. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note
47, at 1331–32, 1344.
86 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
87 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 760 (Court cited SG amicus brief in 40 percent of
cases in which such a brief was filed).
88 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (propriety
of mid–decade reapportionment); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (deference federal
courts should give to state courts in reapportionment litigation); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist.,
397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applicability of one-person, one-vote principle to local governmental unit);
Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (same).
89 See DIMINO, SMITH & SOLIMINE, supra note 21, at 225–26, 285–288 (describing
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leading cases in that category,90 and in cases involving other election
law issues.91
As noted above, the Court citing or discussing the SG’s amicus
brief in the opinions is both an over- and under-inclusive proxy for
the apparent influence of that brief.92 But it can be a useful starting
point to measure influence. On that score, some leading cases do not
refer to the SG’s amicus brief.93 Those that do cite the brief
sometimes make only passing and seemingly inconsequential
references,94 but in others the Court seems to have been particularly
influenced by the brief, as measured by the frequency and depth of
citation to and discussion of the brief.95
Whether the Court agrees with the SG’s position is another
measure of influence. While the overall agreement rate seems
impressive, there are notable exceptions where the Court departed

increasing litigation under the VRA, and constitutional amendments, with regard to districting
and race).
90 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (obligation to create crossover
districts under section 2 of the VRA); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008) (electoral changes
subject to preclearance under section 5 of the VRA); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (racial
gerrymandering); Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (applying section 5 of the
VRA); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (minority–majority districts as court remedy);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (application of 1982 amendments to section 2 of the
VRA); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (challenge under Fifteenth Amendment to
at–large electoral system); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (private right of
action available to enforce VRA).
91 E.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (holding that a
state’s public financing provision that equalized electoral funding in state campaigns was
unconstitutional); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008)
(holding that the state’s voter identification law was constitutional); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395–96 (2000) (concluding that state limits on contributions to state
campaigns was constitutional); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669
(1998) (holding that a state-owned broadcaster could constitutionally exclude a political
candidate from televised debates in a nonpublic forum); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305
(1997) (holding that a state requirement for drug testing of candidates did not fit with the types
of searched permitted by the Constitution); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
783 (1995) (holding that state-passed term limits for members of Congress violated the
Constitution); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that a state’s
poll tax was unconstitutional).
92 See supra notes 60–64 accompanying text.
93 E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. 399; Thornton, 514 U.S. at 779;
Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) (VRA application to state judicial elections); Bolden, 446
U.S. 55; Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
94 E.g., Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19 (referring briefly to the SG amicus brief); Branch v. Smith,
538 U.S. 254, 266 (2003) (same); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 261 n.8, 268 n.22 (1982)
(same).
95 E.g., Lopez, 525 U.S. at 281 (finding it “especially relevant” that the SG’s amicus reads
the section 5 preclearance requirement “as we do”); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S.
186, 231–32 (1996) (“attach[ing] significance” to the SG’s amicus position that private litigants
could enforce the VRA); Allen, 393 U.S. at 557 n.23 (finding it “significant” that the SG amicus
brief urges that private litigants should have standing to sue in order to enforce the VRA).
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from that position,96 sometimes with the Court expressly countering
the SG’s amicus brief.97 The disagreement can of course be a function
of the different jurisprudential positions of a majority of the Court and
the SG at any given point. Those positions were compatible in Baker
and the other early reapportionment cases, but there was divergence
in later voting rights cases as the composition of the Court changed
and new presidents were elected.98
The SG did not participate as amicus in all of the reapportionment
or other election law cases after 1964.99 No doubt, a confluence of
political and practical considerations played roles in decisions
whether the SG should file such briefs in any given case. These
considerations include whether the Court requested the views of the
when it was deciding whether to review a lower court decision, the
general ideological positions of the president and of Congress, and the
96 E.g., Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2824 (directly opposing SG’s amicus brief by holding that
public financing for state elections is unconstitutional); Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502
U.S. 491, 493, 500 (1992) (affirming the District Court’s decision that the section five
preclearance was unnecessary when the SG amicus brief argued for reversal); Bolden, 446 U.S.
at 57, 65 (reversing the lower courts in holding that the at-large electoral systems were
constitutional, whereas the SG and amicus brief argued for affirmance of the lower court);
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 507 n.24 (1977) (stating that, although the SG’s amicus
suggests limited judicial review in certain circumstances, the Court concluded that Congress’s
intent was to exclude all judicial review of Attorney General’s decision on preclearance under
section five of VRA).
97 E.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (expressly rejecting the SG’s amicus
suggestion of mootness); Presley, 502 U.S. at 501, 504–05 (also arguing and concluding against
the SG’s amicus brief and reasoning); id. at 514 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
prior cases call for “considerable deference,” albeit not “acquiescence,” to the Attorney
General’s, and impliedly the SG’s, views as amicus in VRA cases) (citing Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379, 390–91 (1971)); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7, 55, 61–62, 78 (1986)
(disagreeing with various positions taken by the SG in the amicus brief); Morris, 432 U.S. at
507 n.24 (also rejecting the SG’s suggestion. Compare Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 421
(2008) (majority opinion stating that the SG’s amicus brief provides a concession and viewing
the brief with criticism), with id. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (favorably citing the same
amicus brief). Compare Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2824 (discussing “flaws” in the arguments made
by the SG’s amicus brief), with id. at 2842 n.11 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (favorably citing the
same amicus brief).
98 For one prominent example, consider in the Reagan Administration, the SG as amicus
(in a brief filed at the invitation of the Court) argued for a narrow interpretation of the 1982
amendments to the VRA. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 104–05 (1991) (SG Fried describing his negative
reaction to a broader effects test instead of a narrow construction of the VRA); PACELLE, supra
note 45, at 164 (describing SG Fried’s attack on precedence and focusing on a narrow view of
the 1982 amendments to the VRA). A majority of the Court rejected the SG’s position in
Thornburg. See 478 U.S. at 43 n.7, 55, 61–62, 78 (expressly opposing the SG’s arguments). The
SG in the Clinton Administration, in contrast, took a more liberal position as amicus in some
election law cases. See PACELLE, supra note 45, at 182–92 (discussing SG’s amicus filings in
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 876 (1994), which discussed vote dilution under section 2 of the
VRA, and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901–902 (1996), which discussed racial
gerrymandering).
99
See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 356 (1981) (showing a reapportionment or
election law case after 1964 where the SG did not submit an amicus brief).
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perceived importance of the case.100 Perhaps it is surprising that the
SG as amicus participated in as many cases as he did. When the
United States is not a party to the suit, or when the suit does not seem
to directly affect any particular interest of the federal government, it
may not be obvious why the SG is filing an amicus brief at all.
Similarly, while, as in Baker, the SG’s decision to file a brief is often
attributed to stark political considerations that are not expressly
referenced by the SG in the amicus brief or otherwise. Indeed, the
politically charged nature of cases may sometimes lead the SG, contra
Baker, to decline to file an amicus brief.101
Consider the statements of the “interests of the United States”
found in the amicus filings of the SG in these cases. No such
statement is found in the SG’s amicus briefs filed in Baker. But at
oral argument in the case, Cox soothingly told the Court the United
States was participating because it involved the constitutional rights
of “a large number of citizens both in Tennessee and elsewhere,” the
“integrity of the electoral process,” and “of course, a difficult and
delicate question concerning the proper role of the judiciary” in
reviewing reapportionment cases.102 Similar reasons are found in the
SG’s briefs filed in later reapportionment cases.103 In contrast, the
SG’s briefs filed in VRA cases state that the United States’ interest
flows from the attorney general being statutorily designated to
enforce provisions of the VRA.104 The outcome of such a case, even
when the United States is not a party, can affect how the attorney
general will enforce the VRA in other litigation.
100 See Pacelle, supra note 45, at 319–25 (stating the different factors that play into
whether the SG submits an amicus brief in a particular case).
101 Consider that the SG did not file amicus briefs in the two major cases concerning the
justiciability of federal court suits against partisan gerrymandering, Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986), and Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), and that the SG did not participate
as amicus in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The SG did participate as amicus in League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, but his brief addressed only the VRA
issue, not the challenge to the propriety of a mid-decade redistricting. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 9–11, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05–204, 05–276, 05–439), 2006 WL 271820, at *III
(providing an overview of the brief’s legal arguments).
102 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 137.
103 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–4, Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963) (No. 112), 1962 WL 115856, at *3 (discussing the United State’s reasons for
participating); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–4, Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist.,
397 U.S. 50 (1970) (No. 938), 1969 WL 136918, at *3–4 (same).
104 E.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1, League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05–204, 05–276, 05–439), 2006
WL 271820, at *1; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1,
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83–1968), 1985 WL 669641, at *1; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981) (No. 80–180),
1980 WL 339768, at *1.

2012]

THE PATH OF REAPPORTIONMENT LITIGATION

1129

In other words, in the latter cases the United States has a direct
interest, while in the former the governmental interest is, at best,
indirect. This dichotomy is reflective of the decision of the SG to file
an amicus brief in any case. In the latter cases, the government may
be concerned with its enforcement powers, or otherwise have some
direct interest, while in the former cases, the government is pursuing a
broader political or social agenda, unrelated to any direct interest of
or impact on the federal government.105 As noted, Baker and the other
early reapportionment cases clearly fell into the broader political
agenda category, and to their credit, the officials in the three
presidential administrations who filed the briefs made no pretense
otherwise.106 Still, the amicus filings in some post-Baker cases pushed
the category to almost the logical breaking point. Consider the SG
filing amicus briefs in the cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s
regarding whether the one-person, one-vote principle applied to the
districts for local governmental units.107 What possible interest could
the federal government have in the outcome of such a case?108
Commentary on Baker v. Carr and its contemporary cases has
been right to focus on the SG’s amicus briefs filed in those cases,
since there is some evidence that the briefs influenced the decision
making of the justices, and perhaps in other ways. This Article
extends that discussion to the SG’s amicus filings in later
reapportionment and other election law cases. The nature and extent
of that influence, both in Baker and later cases, is a complex matter
that resists easy generalization. Whether and how the Court, or
individual justices, were influenced in any given case can depend on,
105 Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO
ST. L.J. 595, 599 (1986); Pacelle, supra note 45, at 320.
106 An exception to this generalization might be Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964),
which involved the state drawing of districts for elections to the U.S. House of Representatives.
The SG’s amicus brief in that case observed that the “federal government’s interest is perhaps
even greater in this case than in Baker v. Carr since fair representation in the federal legislature,
Congress itself, is involved.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (No. 22), 1963 WL 105668, at *2. Perhaps Congress itself should
have filed an amicus brief in the case, rather than relying on the SG. See Amanda Frost,
Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 914 (2012).
107 See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (SG filed a brief); Avery v.
Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967) (same).
108 In contrasting the “institutional” and “administration” roles of the SG, David Strauss
notes that under some conceptions of the former role, the Executive Branch arguably had no
particular interest in reapportionment cases, and thus should not have filed amicus briefs in
those cases. David A. Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1998, at 165, 171. He argues, in contrast, that if the
reapportionment cases had been brought under the Guarantee Clause, which states that the
“United States shall guarantee to every State . . . a republican Form of Government,” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added), then there would have been a better argument for a
federal government interest in those cases. Strauss, supra note 108, at 171 n.11.
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among other things, the legal and political context of the case prior to
the decision, the dynamics among the justices in deciding the case
and rendering a decision, the reaction anticipated by the Court, and
the actual reaction to the case. Perhaps we should ask whether
influence goes in the other direction as well, or even instead. The
decision of the SG to file an amicus brief, and the content of that
brief, might be influenced in part by the expectation that the Court
wants such a brief or to satisfy constituencies other than the Court.109
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL SAFEGUARDS OF BAKER V. CARR
So far, this Article has been largely Court-centric, focusing on the
Supreme Court’s decisions and the activity of the litigants and amici
in particular cases. A full understanding of the Reapportionment
Revolution also requires an appreciation of actors affected by the
cases, but not directly involved in a particular case. The focus of the
present section of this Article is on Congress.
The Constitution’s Elections Clause110 vests power in Congress to
regulate the process of electing members of Congress within each
state, with the default power vested in the states themselves. Congress
has enacted statutes under that Clause, ranging from an 1842 law that
mandates that states electing more than one member of the House of
Representatives do so by districts111 to the Help America Vote Act of
2002.112 On the whole, though, the states have been the principal
regulators of congressional and state legislative elections.
Nonetheless, the possibility of congressional action has played a
prominent role in reapportionment litigation. Justice Frankfurter in
Colegrove emphasized that Congress had authority to regulate the
drawing of districts for congressional elections within states, and
argued that courts entering this “political thicket” would invade the
prerogatives of Congress.113 Other opinions have similarly referenced

109 Graham, supra note 44, at 266; Pacelle, supra note 45, at 319. As noted earlier, the
Court sometimes requests that the SG file an amicus brief in the case. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.”).
111 1842 Apportionment Act, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842).
112 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2006)). For other examples of congressional action under the
Elections Clause, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to
Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5 (2010).
113 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–56 (1946).
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the Elections Clause in calling for judicial noninterference in some
reapportionment litigation.114
A. Congressional Reaction to the Reapportionment Cases in the
1960s
Congress considered various statutory and constitutional responses
in the wake of Baker. As previously observed,115 the standard account
is that some opposition in Congress arose in the immediate aftermath
of the reapportionment cases, but it soon melted away given the
popularity of those decisions and the lack of support for restrictions
within Congress itself. That account is accurate as far as it goes, but,
to some extent, it understates the depth and complexity of
congressional reaction to the reapportionment and related cases.
Many state governmental officials, and interest groups
representing states, mobilized in the immediate aftermath of Baker.
Most notable were proposals by the Council of State Governments to
amend the Constitution to abolish all substantive guarantees against
malapportionment, to establish a “Court of the Union,” comprised of
all fifty states’ supreme court chief justices with the power to review
Supreme Court decisions, and to make it easier to amend the
Constitution.116 Much discussion on these proposals took place at
various public and private venues in 1962 and 1963, and seventeen
state legislatures eventually passed resolutions calling for passage of
one or more of them.117 But the proposals attracted relatively little
attention to begin with, and upon encountering opposition from
President Kennedy, the American Bar Association, and other leaders
and elites from across the political spectrum, the movement behind
the proposals lost steam.118
Congress apparently paid relatively little attention to Baker itself,
but its attention picked up after the 1963 and 1964 decisions,
particularly Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases, which reached
the merits of Baker-sanctioned attacks on state drawing of legislative
districts, including those for the U.S. House of Representatives. Not
114 E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275–77 (2004) (explaining that the Election
Clause suggested that Congress, not the courts, had the primary role in regulating political
gerrymandering of congressional districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 42–45 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Elections Clause suggested that the one-person, one-vote
principle did not apply to drawing of districts for the House of Representatives).
115 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
116
William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why
Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 534–35 (2002).
117 For an extremely useful and detailed account of the state reaction to Baker, see id. at
529–52.
118 Id. at 552–85.
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surprisingly, the bipartisan opposition was particularly animated in
some quarters of the House, since some incumbents there (unlike in
the Senate) electorally benefitted from malapportioned districts.
Opposition in the House was led by Democratic Representative
William Tuck of Virginia, and in the Senate by Everett Dirksen, the
Republican Minority leader from Illinois. Numerous bills were
introduced in both chambers, which would have variously limited the
jurisdiction of the federal courts over reapportionment cases, or
delayed the implementation of court orders requiring
reapportionment. A bill to limit federal court jurisdiction over such
cases passed the House by the comfortable margin of 242 to 148, with
the support of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans, but
proposals for similar limits languished in the Senate, despite the
support of Dirksen. Once again, a variety of groups across the
political spectrum, inside and outside of Congress, opposed the
proposals.119
The reapportionment decisions were also discussed in the 1964
presidential campaign. President Lyndon Baines Johnson, at least
through his agents in the Department of Justice, expressed opposition
to the bills in Congress, but the issue was not addressed in the
platform of the Democratic Party, and he said little about the cases
during the campaign.120 In contrast, the conservative Republican
nominee for president, Senator Barry Goldwater, criticized the
reapportionment cases as part of his broader critique of Warren Court
decisions which, he argued, demonstrated judicial overreaching and
invaded the prerogatives of the states. The Republican platform
supported measures that would permit at least one part of a bicameral
legislature to be malapportioned, and thus limit or overrule cases like
Reynolds v. Sims.121 President Johnson said little in response, but
various luminaries in the legal establishment criticized Goldwater on
that front, and ultimately Goldwater’s “sharp criticisms of the Court
probably had little impact on the election.”122

119 For detailed accounts of the activity in Congress in 1964, see ANSOLABEHERE &
SNYDER, supra note 7, at 178–80, CORTNER, supra note 7, at 236–42, DIXON, supra note 7, at
385–86, 394–97, and Robert B. McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 255 (1964).
120 McKay, supra note 119, at 266–67. Earlier, top officials from the Department of
Justice, including SG Cox, had met with the aides of Senators Dirksen and Mike Mansfield to
discuss a “compromise” bill which only would have placed time limits on the implementation of
federal court orders in reapportionment cases. But this compromise encountered opposition as
well. Id. at 263–65.
121 William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 391, 427–33 (2002).
122 Id. at 434.
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With the seating of a new Congress in 1965, Senator Dirksen
renewed his efforts to propose a Constitutional amendment that
matched the provision in the 1964 Republican platform. In August of
that year, the proposal passed the Senate fifty-nine to thirty-nine, but
that was seven votes short of the minimum necessary to send it to the
states. Opposition outside of Congress continued to fester, but it too
faded, in part due to the many court-ordered reapportionments that
were taking place.123 By 1968, one or both houses in the legislatures
of forty-nine states had been reapportioned, either by court order or
due to the voluntary actions of legislators.124 And to some degree the
response to Baker was overtaken by the far more negative reaction to
contemporary Warren Court decisions involving school prayer and
criminal justice.125
So, the congressional reaction to Baker and its progeny was
somewhat more complicated and extended than usually presented.
What accounted for the ultimately muted response by Congress, and
how was the Court affected by that response? On the former question,
scholars of Court-congressional relations have identified several
factors that may explain the reaction in Congress, through
jurisdiction-curbing legislative proposals or otherwise, to Court
123 For details on the activity of supporters and opponents of the anti–reapportionment
proposals inside and outside of Congress, see ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 180–
82, CORTNER, supra note 7, at 242–46, and DIXON, supra note 7, at 402–15. Dirksen continued
efforts to pass his proposal. It passed the Senate again in 1966, albeit by fifty–five to thirty–
eight—less than a two–thirds supermajority. Formal opposition to the reapportionment cases
largely ended with Dirksen’s death in 1969. By that time, though, it appears that no less than
thirty–three of the required thirty–four state legislatures had issued calls for the convening of a
constitutional convention to consider adopting the Dirksen proposal or its equivalent. CORTNER,
supra note 7, at 246. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 765–89 (1993)
(listing thirty–two states which at one time had issued such calls). See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The
Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949 (1968) and
Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty–four: The Constitutional Case for a
Constitutional Convention, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 837 (2011) for commentary regarding
whether such calls are still legally viable.
124 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 253.
125 See JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974
565–68 (1996) (highlighting Supreme Court decisions that enhanced civil liberties and the
subsequent reactions of the political right); CORTNER, supra note 7, at 223–26 (discussing how
the opposition to Court decisions on religion and criminal justice during this period also
increased the number of critics of the Court). To be sure, there might well have been
connections between the more controversial Warren Court decisions and the reapportionment
cases, but the strictly doctrinal connections were limited. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The
Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV., 59, 83–84
(acknowledging that reapportionment cases “say nothing explicit about race,” but arguing that
malapportioned legislatures were to the political detriment of urban blacks, and linking cases to
broader racial agenda of the Warren Court); C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the
Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 869 (1964) (drawing connections between Brown and
Baker).
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decisions. These factors include the policy agenda of Congress and its
view of the policy consequences of Court decisions; differing views
of proper constitutional interpretation between members of Congress
and the majority of the Court; the salience of particular issues; the
presence or absence of interest group activity on an issue; and the
support (or lack thereof) inside and outside of Congress for the
Court’s attention to and resolution of a particular issue.126
Application of these factors sheds greater light on the response of
Congress to the reapportionment cases and the ultimate failure of the
constitutional and statutory proposals to overturn or limit the
decisions or restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. We can
stipulate that at least some of the negative response by some members
of Congress was simply due to substantive disagreement with the
interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions by the majority
of the Court.127 Other opposition was driven by the anticipated
electoral or policy consequences of the inevitable reapportioned
nature of state legislatures, and of the districts for House members.128
126 For more extensive discussion of these factors, see generally CHARLES GARDNER
GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE (2006) (providing discussion about the emerging
trends for Congress and the Court to try and exert control over the other); Neal Devins,
Congress and Judicial Supremacy, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 45 (Bruce
Peabody ed., 2011) (examining Congress’s willingness to criticize the Court’s decision making
but hesitancy to take action that restricts the Court’s authority); Miller, supra note 41
(highlighting the intersection of law and politics and the different methods political scientists
use to study that intersection); Grove, supra note 5, at 883–84 (pointing out how the
confirmation procedures for justices ensure their political views align, at least in part, with some
members of the legislature and consequently are at odds with the views of others).
127 See CORTNER, supra note 7, at 243 (discussing congressional hearings on the Dirksen
amendment); DIXON, supra note 7, at 386 (commenting on the development of the measure
introduced by Dirksen). In contrast, at least one prominent contemporary observer dismissed the
constitutional discussion as grandstanding, since (referring to the Tuck bill) he opined that the
House did not “seriously intend the enactment of this drastic legislation.” McKay, supra note
119, at 269. But that observation should be tempered by the fact that the same observer later
enthusiastically endorsed the reapportionment cases; see generally Robert B. McKay,
Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968) (providing
remarks on why the reapportionment cases were so successful and how the results were,
comparatively, so easily achieved). This is an illustration of the difficulty of objectively
determining how seriously Congress discharges its obligation to consider constitutional issues in
the legislative process. See generally Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional
Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011) (arguing
that congressional committees in recent years have paid less and less attention to Constitutional
issues); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525, 525 (2009) (arguing that
asking “whether Congress is capable of conscientious, responsible constitutional interpretation”
is not the proper question); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983) (discussing how Congress should be more active in
evaluating potential constitutional shortcomings of legislation); Mark Tushnet, Is Congress
Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional Interpretation?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499
(2009) (contending “conceptual problems and institutional features” within Congress make it
difficult to determine whether Congress has the ability to appropriately consider Constitutional
issues).
128
CORTNER, supra note 7, at 244–45.
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On the other hand, there was ideological support for the decisions in
Congress and leading interest groups.129 And the likely political
consequences of the decisions generated support for the
reapportionment decisions in Congress and the executive branch.130
Indeed, it has been argued that many of the reapportioned legislatures
in the 1960s largely inured to the electoral benefit of Democrats (as
the Kennedy administration had predicted), because many then extant
malapportioned plans had favored Republicans.131 Though there were
Democrats of many different ideological stripes in the 1960s, that
party nonetheless controlled both chambers of Congress and the
presidency during the decade until 1969. All of these factors
combined with the support for the reapportionment cases from the
interested public to doom congressional proposals to restrict the
cases.
How much did the Supreme Court react to the anticipated or actual
congressional opposition when rendering the reapportionment cases?
On balance, the answer seems to be very little. The opinions
characteristically say nothing about this topic, though several of the
justices, in the course of public remarks, unusually made direct and
critical reference to the earlier opposition to Baker at the state level.132
Addressing this issue from a broader perspective, empirical studies
have suggested that the Court, to certain degrees, does take into
account the anticipated or actual negative reaction in Congress when
it renders constitutional law decisions.133 But even if that is true as a
whole, it does not characterize the Court’s reapportionment cases.
Part of the reason, it would seem, is that a majority of the Court was
not oblivious to the support of the executive branch, principally
though not only through the SG’s amicus briefs. The justices were
129

Id. at 243.
of Congress may welcome Supreme Court intervention in order to overcome
entrenched political opponents. The inherent difficulty of nonjudicial means for legislators to
change malapportioned legislatures is a classic example. Whittington, supra note 64, at 587–89.
The president may find it appropriate to oppose restrictions on federal court jurisdiction, since
federal courts are an important venue for executive enforcement of federal law, or simply a
forum to advance his general policy objectives. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards
of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250 (2012).
131 GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 22–24 (2002).
132 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 223, 225 (reporting criticisms in speeches in 1963 by Chief
Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and Goldberg).
133 See TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 18–24 (2011) (noting how
the Supreme Court uses court–curbing bills, among other things, to understand its current level
of institutional legitimacy and public support); Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A.
Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional
Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89 (2011) (describing how the Court, at least
in part, takes into account the current support for legislation in Congress when considering
constitutional challenges to that legislation).
130 Members
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presumably also not oblivious to the Democratic majorities in
Congress at the time, which might have led them to conclude that
efforts to limit federal court involvement on this issue were unlikely
to succeed. Most of negative reaction in Congress, it might be said,
came too late: immediately after Baker or even Wesberry (decided in
February of 1964) would have been the optimal time for opponents to
strike. But most of the reaction took place after Reynolds and its
companion cases in June of 1964 and reapportionment of
congressional and state legislative districts, was well underway in
1964 and 1965.134
In some ways, the Court itself controlled the rapidity of this line of
decisions. All of the reapportionment decisions starting with Baker
were direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district courts, and
the Court could not have been unaware of that fact and the rapid
nature of appeals from such decisions, as compared to the normal
appellate process. The Court was able to promptly accept review of
such appeals and decide them in relatively quick fashion.135 A long
series of reapportionment cases strung out over several years, in
contrast, might have given opponents, inside and outside of Congress,
more time to effectively mobilize. Finally, to some extent the
constitutional heavy lifting was accomplished in the 1964 cases. The
Court would continue to decide reapportionment cases throughout the
1960s, but many were not blockbuster decisions.136 The relatively
clear mandate of the one-person, one-vote principle, and the complete
enforcement and (if perhaps grudging in some places) compliance by
other political institutions (i.e., federal and state courts, and state
legislatures) combined to limit the controversy over the decisions.
B. The Three-Judge District Court in Reapportionment and Voting
Rights Act Cases
The story of the institution of the three-judge district court
illustrates how Congress has influenced reapportionment litigation by
134 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 7, at 178–82 (describing reapportionment
activities in 1964 and 1965).
135 Id. at 170–72 (describing how many reapportionment challenges were filed and litigated
before three–judge district courts shortly after Baker was decided in March of 1962 or already
being litigated before Baker, with many direct appeals of such cases reaching the Court in 1963
and 1964); CORTNER, supra note 7, at 184–86 (providing further details on the apportionment
cases that were on the road to the Court shortly after Baker); id. at 192 n.1 (shortly after
Reynolds and its companion cases were decided, the Court disposed of and remanded by per
curiam opinions pending appeals from reapportionment decisions from nine states).
136 Michael E. Solimine, The Causes and Consequences of the Reapportionment
Revolution, 1 ELECTION L.J. 579, 581 (2002) [hereinafter Solimine, Causes] (reviewing COX &
KATZ, supra note 131, noting that the Court did not again decide any important reapportionment
cases involving congressional districting until the late 1960s and 1970s).
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providing a special forum for the litigation of those cases. Congress
did not intentionally set out to do so. The story begins long before
Baker in 1908, when the Court decided Ex parte Young,137 holding
that federal judges could enjoin the enforcement of state statutes
(regulating railroad rates) which violated federal constitutional rights
of railroads. The case was extremely controversial for its time, since it
clarified that states could be sued in federal courts (by enjoining state
officials),138 and was perceived as yet another decision by a
conservative Court striking down Progressive Era legislation.139
Congress responded to the decision by creating a three-judge district
court to hear Ex parte Young-like challenges to statewide legislation.
The court consisted of a district judge before whom the case was
originally filed, joined by two other judges (typically one circuit
judge and one district judge, usually from the same state) appointed
by the Chief Judge of the relevant circuit, with a direct appeal of its
decision to the Supreme Court. The premise behind the court was that
three judges, rather than one, might better consider the important and
delicate task of assessing the constitutionality of state statutes; that
any such decision might be better received than a decision by a sole
district judge; and that a direct appeal would make it easier for the
Supreme Court to promptly resolve the case.140
While originally framed as a liberal break on conservative federal
judges to protect state prerogatives, in subsequent decades the threejudge district court in some quarters came to constitute almost the
opposite premise. After World War II, many civil rights cases in
Southern states, challenging state provisions that discriminated
against African Americans, were litigated before such courts. The
attorneys that brought such suits came to conclude that they were
more likely to succeed before three federal judges, as opposed to just
one, possibly hostile jurist, with the added benefit of a prompt direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, which by the 1950s and 1960s came to
be seen as a sympathetic forum for their causes.141 To be sure, the
early reapportionment cases, which were all challenges to statewide
137 209

U.S. 123 (1908).
Id. at 155–56.
139
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three–Judge
District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 101 (2008) [hereinafter Solimine, Congress].
140 The three-judge district court statute is now codified, as amended, in 28 U.S.C. § 2284
(2006), and the direct appeal provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006). A discussion of
Ex parte Young and the congressional reaction to it, which culminated in the 1910 statute, is
found in Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 104–18.
141 Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 125–34. The most notable example of this
litigation strategy is Brown v. Board of Educucation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Solimine, Congress,
supra note 139, at 126–28.
138
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laws and hence fell under the coverage of the three-judge district
court, did not particularly benefit from being litigated in those courts.
Plaintiffs in Baker v. Carr142 and most (though not all) other cases143
initially lost below, but they were able to promptly appeal losses to
what turned out to be a sympathetic Supreme Court.
Shortly after the Court’s first round of reapportionment cases,
Congress affirmatively embraced the three-judge district court as the
appropriate and sympathetic forum to adjudicate certain cases under
the VRA, passed in 1965. Under section 5 of the VRA, as it stands
now, nine Southern states, and some subsections of other states, must
seek preclearance from the federal government before changing
certain voting provisions. The requirement is premised on historic
discrimination in those states against the voting rights of African
Americans and other minorities. Those jurisdictions can seek
preclearance by obtaining the permission of the Department of
Justice, or by filing a declaratory judgment action before a threejudge district court in the District of Columbia.144
Placing these cases in that venue was a matter of controversy. The
congressional rationale appears to have been based on venue
requirements for actions against federal officials, many of whom
work in the District of Columbia, and more substantively on the
notion that the VRA would be more expansively interpreted, and
receive more of a uniform application, by the presumably
nonparochial federal judges in the District of Columbia. Absent this
provision, preclearance actions would have been litigated in federal
courts in the affected states, before local federal judges who,
Congress apparently presumed, might be more sympathetic to state
interests and less to the requirements of the VRA.145 Not surprisingly,
142 369 U.S. 186 (1962), rev’d 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959) (per curiam) (three–
judge court). For a discussion of the three judges in the district court in Tennessee and the
proceedings before them, see CORTNER, supra note 7, at 60–69.
143 See e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1964), rev’d Wesberry v. Vandiver,
206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (three–judge court) (reversing the dismissal of plaintiffs
complaint); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964), aff’d Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp.
431 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (affirming the District Court’s finding for
plaintiffs); Lucas v. Forty–Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964), rev’d
Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922 (D. Colo. 1963) (three-judge court) (reversing the dismissal of
plaintiffs claim).
144 42 U.S.C. § 1973b–c (2006); 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 51 (2011). For further details on the
preclearance provisions and their application by courts, see DIMINO, SMITH & SOLIMINE, supra
note 21, at 225–83.
145 See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 16–20 (1987) (discussing controversial measures of the VRA); J.
Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–2007,
86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 681 (2008) (discussing the legislative history of adding Section 5 to the
VRA); see also, Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 132–33 (discussing possible rationales
for vesting judicial preclearance in a three–judge district court in the District of Columbia).
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southern Democrats in both chambers were among the leaders of the
congressional opposition to this provision, including Representative
Tuck.146 Perhaps surprisingly, given his opposition at the time to the
reapportionment cases, among the congressional leaders supporting
the provision was Senator Dirksen.147 The VRA survived a
constitutional challenge the year after passage in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.148 There, the majority acknowledged the burden on state
governments of litigating cases in the District of Columbia, but found
it a permissible exercise of congressional power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.149 Justice Hugo Black dissented in
part on the basis (echoing congressional critics) that the preclearance
provision forced states “to entreat federal authorities in far-away
places for approval of local laws.”150 The VRA and the preclearance
component have been reauthorized by Congress in 1970, 1975, 1982,
and 2006, and the exclusive venue of the District of Columbia court
has not been revisited.151
supra note 145, at 19–20 (quoting Tuck).
a detailed discussion of the Senate opposition to the District of Columbia venue for
preclearance actions and Dirksen’s role in overcoming it, see Gyung–Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller
& Itai Sened, Closing the Deal: Negotiating Civil Rights Legislation, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
588, 599–601 (2009).
148 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
149 Id. at 331.
150 Id. at 359 (Black, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court subsequently engaged in some
revisionist history in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 562–63 (1969), when it stated
that federalism concerns raised by federal court review of state voting procedures called for a
special court to convene to resolve those concerns. This suggests that the District of Columbia
court was deemed to be protective of state prerogatives, when Congress seemed to hold the
opposite assumption.
151 Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of
Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 784 n.76 (2007) [hereinafter
Solimine, Institutional Process] (Congress rejected subsequent efforts to extend the venue of
preclearance actions). The preclearance provision has recently been the subject of constitutional
attack, on the basis that the law exceeds the powers of Congress, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (not reaching such a challenge to the
2006 reauthorization of the VRA since case resolved on other grounds), and been the subject of
considerable scholarly literature, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 17 (Guy–Uriel E. Charles,
Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011) [hereinafter RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION]; Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting, Race, and the Voting Rights Act, 3 NAT’L
AFF., Spring 2010, at 52; Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act
Preclearance, 49 HOW. L.J. 785 (2006), but there has apparently been little if any discussion of
modifying the venue for preclearance actions. It is worth noting that litigation challenging the
constitutionality of Section 5 continues. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F.Supp.2d 424
(D.D.C. 2011) –(upholding constitutionality of section 5), aff’d, No. 11–5256, 2012 WL
1759997 (May 18, 2012) The latter case was decided by a single district judge, unlike the three–
judge district court that considered the NAMUNDO case. The difference is due to the plaintiff in
NAMUNDO having requested a bailout under section 5, which is heard by a three-judge district
court. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S. Ct. at 508; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5) (2006).
In contrast, the plaintiff in Shelby County did not request a bailout or preclearance, but simply
asked for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of that provision. Shelby Cnty.,811
146 THERNSTROM,
147 For
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Congress revisited the use of the three-judge district court in the
1970s. While that court had been perceived to be a welcome device
by some civil rights plaintiffs, it became increasingly unpopular
among many federal judges and Supreme Court justices. Their
opposition was based on the administrative burdens on the three
judges sitting in a trial capacity; the relatively large number of cases
in the 1950s and 1960s that went before such courts; and the burden
on the Supreme Court to hear and dispose of the numerous, ostensibly
mandatory, direct appeals from such courts, when otherwise many
appeals would have been resolved in the circuit courts with only
review by certiorari thereafter.152 By the early 1970s, the Supreme
Court, the American Law Institute, a distinguished committee
appointed by Chief Justice Warren Burger, and others had called for
the abolition of the three-judge district court, casting their arguments
in wholly practical, nonideological terms.153 Congress took up the
proposals, and although the NAACP and other civil rights
organizations opposed the change, bipartisan support was too strong
and the repeal passed in 1976.154
Some of the abolitionists had argued that the three-judge district
court should continue to be used for certain types of controversial
matters, such as reapportionment cases. The precise rationale for such
an exception was never made clear. The unelaborated argument was
made that the court ought to be used for such cases because of their
asserted “public importance” and the need for the “public acceptance”
of such decisions.155 While the supposed widespread acceptance of
the reapportionment decisions is frequently asserted, perhaps the
decennial practice of federal courts reviewing the actions of state
legislatures on districting was unsettling, in the minds of some
members of Congress (and even some judges), and they concluded
that three federal judges undertaking that task should be left intact.
Likewise, members of Congress may have thought that
reapportionment cases were genuinely difficult to resolve and that

F.Supp.2d at 427. .The same judge in parallel litigation held that a three-judge district court
need not be convened to hear such a case. Laroque v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156, 165–66
(D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
152 Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at 134–37 (discussing opposition among federal
judges and others).
153 Id. at 138–41.
154 Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §
2284 (2006)). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the repeal, see Solimine,
Congress, supra note 139, at 141–48.
155 Id. at 142 (referring to congressional testimony by well–known federal judges Henry J.
Friendly and J. Skelly Wright).
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three minds were better than one. Finally, some members may have
thought that some (perhaps many) federal judges were inevitably
prone to partisan decision making when reviewing the districts drawn
by state legislatures, and that such partisanship might be diluted when
three federal judges heard the case rather than one.156 The enacted
legislation contained the exception.
How has the three-judge district court worked in such cases since
1976?157 This question is difficult to answer, since the perceived
importance or acceptance of such cases is difficult to measure, as
would be a comparison to the decision making in these cases by
single district judges, with normal appellate review thereafter, had the
court been totally abolished. Some efforts have been made to analyze
the composition of and decision making by three-judge district courts
and litigant behavior in reapportionment cases, which can shed light
on the question.
Both before and after the 1976 amendment, the Chief Judge of the
circuit in which the case is filed is statutorily tasked with appointing
the two additional members of the panel.158 Prior to the amendment,
there is some evidence that in some civil rights cases in the 1960s,
Chief Judges would occasionally appear to “stack” the composition of
the panel to achieve a presumably favorable outcome, especially
when the judge to whom the case was originally assigned seemed
hostile to the enforcement of civil rights.159 Assuming such stacking
sometimes took place, did it happen in reapportionment cases? Not so

156 Id.

at 144–45.
an overview of the operation of three-judge district courts in election law cases, see
Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433,
455–67. Many reapportionment cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause are coupled
with claims under the VRA. While the exception does not textually cover the latter claims, the
exception has been construed to apply to cases where both claims are raised. Page v. Bartels,
248 F.3d 175, 187–91 (3d Cir. 2001) (illustrating this point); Michael E. Solimine, The Three–
Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 79, 95–97 (1996)
[hereinafter Solimine, Three-Judge District Court]. Also, states covered by section 5 may need
to have their reapportionment plans reviewed by two different three–judge district courts. See,
e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 941–43 (2012) (per curiam) (while waiting for decision by
three–judge district court in D.C. on section 5 preclearance review, three–judge district court in
Texas must defer to initial redrawing of districts by the Texas legislature when drawing interim
maps).
158 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1)(2006). Usually, cases are randomly assigned to federal district
judges, and three-judge panels on the Courts of Appeals are randomly constituted. J. Robert
Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Courts of Appeals, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1041 (2000).
159 For an overview and evaluation of the evidence, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to
Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1729 (1993) (describing
evidence); Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 110–16. Most of evidence
concerns the alleged stacking by Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit, an Eisenhower
appointee from Georgia with notably progressive views on civil rights and race. Id. at 111–12.
157 For
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much, it appears.160 The hearings that led up to the 1976 statutory
change appear not to have directly addressed the issue.161 One study
of eighty-nine cases (many of them reapportionment matters) decided
after the amendment, from 1976 to 1994, indicates that in only five
cases was more than one circuit judge added to the panel, and in
seventy-three cases all of the judges were from one state, leading to
the conclusion that “a highly politicized composition process” had not
taken place.162 On the other hand, the same study reported a survey
taken of Chief Judges and circuit executives in 1995. The survey
indicated that purely administrative reasons were employed to decide
who would serve on the panel, but responses from at least two circuits
indicated that the Chief Judges would sometimes overtly attempt to
balance the panel politically, given the politically consequential
nature of reapportionment cases.163 Perhaps it was used in other
circuits as well. This milder form of stacking might be applauded as
an effort to create the appearance (and actuality) of fairness in such
cases, or criticized as an inappropriate overt step that institutionalizes
judicial partisanship.164
The purported stacking of three-judge panels raises the issue of
whether federal judges are making partisan decisions in
160 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (three–judge court)
(2–1 decision), rev’d sub nom. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). In the district court,
Chief Judge Tuttle appointed himself, and Circuit Judge Griffin Bell, who also had a generally
progressive record in civil rights cases, to the panel in an important reapportionment case, but
Tuttle ended up dissenting in the case when Bell and the district judge found for the defendant.
161 The legislative history of the amendment makes no direct reference to the alleged
stacking issue, although it does characterize the Chief Judge’s role as “entirely ministerial.”
Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 112 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94–1379,
at 7 (1976)).
162 Id. at 114. The study did not directly examine the political composition of the appointed
judges, and suggested more extensive study of that issue would be appropriate to more fully
examine the possible “packing” phenomenon. Id. at 114–15. A recent study by Mark McKenzie,
whose work I rely on below, see infra notes 170–74 & accompanying text, provides additional
albeit indirect support for the conclusion that little overt stacking takes place. He studied the
judicial behavior of members of three–judge district courts in 149 redistricting decisions from
1981 to 2007. Rather than using the proxy of the party of the appointing president, he used the
self–described partisan affiliation (if any) of the judges prior to their appointment. In only
twenty–two of the 149 decisions were the panels made up entirely of the judges of one party
(ten all Republican, twelve all Democratic). Of the remaining panels, forty–two had one
Democrat, while fifty–nine had one Republican. Twenty six panels had one or more
independents sitting. E–mail from Mark McKenzie, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Texas Tech University, to Michael E. Solimine, Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati
College of Law (Oct. 12, 2011, 21:31 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter McKenzie email].
In compiling this data, Prof. McKenzie did not directly examine (nor did the study mentioned in
the text) the process of appointment of any given panel, and the personnel options available to
the appointing Chief Judge of the circuit for any particular case. But, if overt stacking by Chief
Judges were taking place in these cases, presumably there would be more instances of all–
Republican or all–Democratic panels.
163 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 113.
164 For a discussion of the competing concerns, see id. at 127, 135.
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reapportionment cases and related election law cases. Many studies of
decision making by federal judges assume their ideological
preferences are the same as the presidents who appointed them, and
that decisions in this context can be categorized as liberal or
conservative, depending on whether the plaintiff or defendant
prevailed in a case involving, say, the VRA.165 The assumption of
much of the literature is that judges will attempt to favor the political
party with whom they were affiliated in some way. But such studies
must be used with caution in evaluating judicial performance in
reapportionment and related cases. The oft-used proxy of the party of
the appointing president can be a crude measure of presumed judicial
ideology. Presidents occasionally name judges affiliated with the
opposing political party, since lower court appointments can be
influenced by the party affiliations of Senators from the state of
appointment. Likewise, the precise nature of the reapportionment plan
typically under review by a federal court needs to be examined to
determine if a federal judge is supposedly favoring his or her party,
rather than simply determining if a plaintiff or defendant prevails.166
Whatever measures are used, the empirical evidence on ideological
or partisan voting by federal judges in reapportionment and related
cases is mixed. Some studies have suggested that federal judges do
act in partisan ways in considering the validity of reapportionment
plans.167 Other studies have suggested that federal judges, on the
whole, do not vote in overtly partisan ways in reapportionment and
other related election law cases.168 Consider one recent, relatively
165 For one representative study with these characteristics, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J.
Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1493 (2008) (empirical study of federal court decisions concerning section 2 of the VRA,
using the party of the appointing president as a proxy for ideological preference of federal
judges). This study did not specifically differentiate the voting of district judges sitting alone
from those in three-judge district courts.
166 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 121–23 (discussing
complexities of empirical study of judicial behavior in this context). See also Solimine,
Institutional Process, supra note 151, at 789–90 (discussing the same). Similar difficulties
attend the study of judicial review of racially gerrymandered districts. It is sometimes said that
such districts, ostensibly established to aid the election of minorities, usually affiliated with the
Democratic party, are supported by Republican operatives, to pack minority voters into one
district and lessen their influence in other districts. So a judge who presumably favors the GOP
may nonetheless be motivated to uphold the validity of such districts. Solimine, Causes, supra
note 136, at 583. But see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and
Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2011) (arguing against consensus that
minority-majority districts, as required by the VRA, often hurt Democrats, due to diverse
behavior by voters, and that such districts also constrain Republicans in the redistricting
process).
167 See, e.g., Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research:
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413 (1995) (study of
eighty–nine cases decided from 1964 to 1983).
168 See Solimine, Institutional Process, supra note 151, at 790–91 (reaching this
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comprehensive study of 149 three-judge district court decisions from
1981 to 2007.169 This study found that “partisanship matters” in
reapportionment cases, but “partisan favoritism is conditioned by the
type of legal case.”170 Thus, it found that in cases only concerning the
one-person, one-vote principle, usually regarded as a fairly settled
area of law, there was little partisan voting, but there was more
partisanship for attacks on redistricting plans under the VRA, an area
of law less settled.171 The study concluded that judicial partisanship
was “constrained,” because if “judges were crass partisan actors . . .
then they should uphold” more than they did state legislative
districting plans formulated by their own parties.172
Other evidence suggests that federal judges act in distinctive ways
in redistricting cases. Surveys of judges have confirmed that they are
not oblivious to the political implications of redistricting decisions,
and indeed some judges suggested that such cases led to animosity
and a lack of collegiality within the panel.173 There are also higher
rates of dissent in these cases, as compared to the low rate of dissent
in three-judge panels in the courts of appeals in all cases.174 Judges
might react in two ways to this stress. Some might compensate by
taking the greatest care to exclude their own political considerations
from influencing their vote in the case. Others might take the opposite
tack and, consciously or unconsciously, take political considerations

conclusion from discussion of studies up till 2006, though acknowledging that there can be
individual cases that are exceptions to this generalization); Richard L. Hasen, Judges as
Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION, supra note 151, at 101, 104–08 (survey of empirical studies of voting by federal
and state judges in election law cases).
169 Mark Jonathan McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on
Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts, POL. RES. Q. (forthcoming), available at
http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/09/03/1065912911421012.abstract.
170 Id. at 9. The study used the “common space” score of judges, as a measure of presumed
ideology, rather than automatically using the proxy of the party of the appointing president. Id.
at 6. “Common space” scores are predicated on measures of ideology of the appointing
president and those of the Senators of the state from where the judge is appointed. See Lee
Epstein, et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (discussing this
method of measurement).
171 McKenzie, supra note 169, at 10.
172 Id. at 9.
173 Mark Jonathan McKenzie, Beyond Partisanship? Federal Courts, State Commissions,
and Redistricting 154–55 (August 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas)
(on file with author), available at http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/3367
(summarizing results of survey of federal judges in redistricting cases).
174 Solimine, Three–Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 139, tbl.4 (in eighty–nine
three-judge court cases from 1976 to 1994, there were twenty–two dissents); McKenzie email,
supra note 162 (reporting higher rates of dissent in study of 149 three–judge district court
decisions from 1981 to 2007, than that typically found in three–judge panels on the Courts of
Appeals).
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into account if they perceive that is the proper and expected role of
judges on a “politically balanced” panel.
Other aspects of decision making by three-judge district courts, as
opposed to district judges acting alone, have been examined. One
concern of such cases is that district judges might excessively defer to
the votes of the circuit judge sitting on the panel. Studies have shown
that circuit judges were not disproportionately authoring majority
opinions in such cases.175 Another reason for leaving such panels
intact to hear reapportionment cases is that three judges would better
arrive at a decision in these often complicated cases than merely one.
There seems almost universal agreement that these are indeed
difficult cases, not only due to the potential complications of the
substantive law, but because that abundant expert testimony on
quantitative issues is often presented and must be digested by the
court.176 It is difficult to objectively measure whether three judges,
collectively acting, deal with or use such evidence better than one
judge.177 No doubt, the conclusion on this score is often in the eye of
the beholder.
A final peculiarity of the three-judge district court is the
availability of direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Studies have
shown that appeals are filed in about 30 to 40 percent of such cases,
which is higher than the typical rate of appeal for any given civil case
decided by a district judge sitting alone.178 No doubt the discrepancy
is due to the consequential nature of such decisions to the political
operatives in the states, who are parties to or behind the litigation. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has often disposed of such
putatively mandatory appeals in a summary fashion, which seems to
175 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 117–20 (study of 89 decisions
of such courts between 1976 and 1994).
176 D. James Greiner, The Quantitative Empirics of Redistricting Litigation: Knowledge,
Threats to Knowledge, and the Need for Less Districting, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 527, 532–
38 (2011) (discussing problems associated with judicial use of sophisticated quantitative
evidence in redistricting cases); Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 156, at 116–
17 (discussing the problems of generalized judges dealing with a specialized area of the law).
177 The study by McKenzie, supra note 169, found that the partisan composition of the
panel had no effect on the individual voting behavior of judges. McKenzie email, supra note
162 (commenting on findings not presented in forthcoming article). This suggests that the
judges were reaching decisions free of undue influence of the other members of the panel.
178 Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 99. One treatise reports a
significant diminution of direct appeals since the 1976 amendment, using data from selected
Terms in various decades. GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 91 (reporting drop in such
appeals, from three–judge district courts and certain district judges sitting alone, of 211 in 1971
Term, to six and two in the 2003 and 2004 Terms, respectively). These figures may not take into
account that the number of direct appeals would be expected to be higher in the early terms of
any given decade, since reapportionment litigation generally takes place shortly after the
redistricting that takes place early in a decade. Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note
157, at 108.
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diminish the asserted utility of permitting direct appeals.179 On
balance, the possibility of a direct appeal probably does not much
affect the behavior of the judges on a three-judge district court. The
Supreme Court rarely reviews the decisions of lower courts (i.e., the
U.S. Courts of Appeals and state supreme courts) in the normal
appellate process. The same is true for direct appeals of three-judge
district court decisions. Yet there is considerable evidence that the
threat of review and reversal has a constraining effect on the behavior
of lower court judges.180 That, combined with the presumed fact that
most federal judges internalize, to various degrees, norms of stare
decisis, and the highly salient nature of reapportionment cases inside
and outside the legal community suggests that the members of a
three-judge district court are no more likely to ignore law and
precedent any more than their brethren (and themselves) when sitting
outside of that court.181
Congress left the three-judge district court intact to decide
“important” reapportionment cases, and the largely unarticulated
presumption was that litigation before that court would be different
than that before single district judges. The presumption might be well
founded, though perhaps not in all ways contemplated by Congress in
1976. While there is little evidence of overt stacking of such panels,
there is some evidence, in some cases, that judges, consciously or not,
take partisan considerations into account in their decision making.
Nor is it clear that three judge panels render better or more accepted
decisions, in any meaningful sense, than would one judge, with
normal appellate review thereafter. The possibility of direct review by
the Supreme Court has apparently not had much of a constraining
effect, different from the normal appeal process that follows the
decision of a district judge. It is thus difficult to settle on a facile
conclusion regarding the efficacy of the three-judge district court in
reapportionment and related cases since 1976.182
179 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 304–10; Solimine, Congress, supra note 139, at
127 n.134.
180 For an overview of the considerable empirical literature that supports this proposition,
see Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 535, 556–57 (2011).
181 Solimine, Three–Judge District Court, supra note 158, at 109.
182 Despite that ambiguous record, Congress since 1976 has created special three-judge
district courts as forums to consider legal challenges to other federal statutes. For examples, see
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 102–03 (listing seven such statutes enacted since 1986).
Most notable in the election law field is the three-judge district court in the District of Columbia
which hears legal challenges to various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, (2002), codified at 2 U.S.C. §
437h. For discussion of that provision and its frequent use, see Douglas, supra note 157, at 455–
58; Solimine, Institutional Process, supra note 151, at 771–79. Recent examples of litigation
before that court include Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (on review of three-
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Many of the reapportionment cases have suggested that Congress
could and should take a more active role in regulating state
reapportionment of electoral districts, at least for members of
Congress. Those calls continue to the present day,183 though the
support in Congress for such laws has been modest.184 No doubt, the
inaction is because many incumbents in both parties prefer the status
quo and the inability to forge a bipartisan consensus among those who
do not prefer the status quo. If those proposals were to pass, it would
seem that there would be less litigation challenging redistricting, and
less work for three-judge district courts. But until that day arrives, the
three-judge district court will be the main vehicle of congressional
regulation of the state redistricting process. So far as I know, there
have been no proposals to abolish the three-judge district court.185
Apparently, policymakers are satisfied with the status quo on that
front as well.
CONCLUSION
Over forty years ago, one scholar of the reapportionment decisions
argued that the decisions “primarily required acquiescence by state
legislatures and state election officials, but it did not require positive
support by either Congress or the president in order to be enforced
effectively.”186 Strictly speaking, that is correct, but the thesis of this
Article is that Baker v. Carr and the other reapportionment decisions
of the early 1960s can only be understood and appreciated in light of
the actions of the other branches of the federal government. The

judge district court, holding unconstitutional BCRA provisions with limit independent
expenditures by corporations and unions); Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012), aff’d mem.,
800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (three-judge court) (upholding constitutionality of BCRA
provisions barring political contributions by nonresident aliens).
183 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412,
416–17 (2006) (proposing a federal administrative agency to regulate gerrymandering in all 50
states); Joseph A. Peters, The Meaningful Vote Commission: Restraining Gerrymanders with a
Federal Agency, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1051, 1060–63 (2010) (discussing a similar proposal);
David Schultz, Regulating the Political Thicket: Congress, the Courts, and State
Reapportionment Commissions, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 107, 139–43 (2008) (giving an
overview of options for Congress).
184 J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform To Rein
in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 555 (2011) (reviewing
congressional bills that would reform state redistricting by encouraging or mandating the use of
bipartisan redistricting commissions, but concluding that congressional action in the near term is
unlikely).
185 Other than myself. See Solimine, Three-Judge District Court, supra note 157, at 126–
28 (arguing that the purported advantages of the court have been overstated, and that one district
judge, with the normal appellate process thereafter, should hear reapportionment cases).
186 CORTNER, supra note 7, at 260.
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executive branch supported the decisions ex post by the Solicitor
General’s filing of amicus curiae briefs. In contrast, certain influential
quarters of Congress criticized the decisions, and proposals that
would have limited the impact of, or even overturned, the cases were
given serious attention in Congress. Those efforts eventually did not
prevail, though that failure may obscure some continuing, low–level
opposition among elected state officials to federal court intervention
in their redrawing of districts.187 Both strands of action by the other
branches have continued to influence the judicial progeny of Baker
and of decisions regarding its first juridical cousin under the VRA.
The SG has since been frequently involved as a party or as an amicus
in reapportionment, VRA, and other election law cases. Congress, for
good or ill, has largely taken a hands-off attitude toward the
adjudication of these cases, with the notable exception of maintaining
the peculiar institution of the three-judge district court to hear such
cases.188 In these ways, the federal courts have not been and are not
autonomous institutions when reviewing the redistricting decisions of
states.
APPENDIX: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS IN
SUPREME COURT ELECTION LAW CASES, 1960-2011
Methodological note: for details on how the cases listed below
were complied, see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. In
addition, two cases listed by Hasen, in which the SG did file an
amicus brief, see In re Heardon, 394 U.S. 399 (1969) (per curiam);
Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), are not listed here, since they
187 As one example, consider the reaction of William Batchelder, the Speaker of the Ohio
House, to the possibility of such federal court intervention. In the wake of State ex rel. Ohioans
for Fair Dists. v. Husted, 957 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio 2011), in which the Ohio Supreme Court held
that there could be a referendum to review the districting plan approved by the state legislature,
Batchelder worried that the congressional redistricting plan would be reviewed and possibly
changed “by unelected federal judges, who may be judges from Michigan, Kentucky or
Tennessee.” Howard Wilkinson, Ruling Muddles Election Process: Congressional Races
Thrown Into Chaos, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 16, 2011, at A1, A12. Batchelder was
apparently referring to possible review by a three-judge district court, but past experience shows
that such courts almost always are constituted of federal judges from the state in question. See
supra note 135 and accompanying text. To be fair to Batchelder, he was apparently unhappy
with any “judicial interference in the [redistricting process],” id. at A12, from federal or state
courts.
188 Members of Congress sometimes file amicus briefs in the reapportionment and other
election law cases discussed in this article. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae
Brief on Behalf of Appellees, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83–1968), 1985
WL 669643; Brief of McConnell et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Crawford v.
Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Nos. 07–21, 07–25), 2007 WL 4340890.
However, such briefs are filed much less often than those filed by the SG, and it appears to
much less effect. See COLLINS, supra note 49, at 181–82.

2012]

THE PATH OF REAPPORTIONMENT LITIGATION

1149

involved a contempt proceeding, and the issue of whether a pro se
attorney may recover attorney’s fees, respectively, neither of which
directly concerns the issues addressed in this article. The agreement
or disagreement between the position taken by the SG, and the
decision of the Court, is determined by the characterization of the
SG’s position as listed in the Court’s decision and determined by the
Reporter of Decisions, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 42, at 83842 (discussing use of these sources to characterize the position taken
by amicus briefs), or through an examination of the content of the
amicus brief. Any reference to the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in
any of the opinions of the Court in a case is counted as a citation.
1. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); agree; no
citation.
2. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); agree; no citation.
3. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); agree; citation.
4. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); agree; no
citation.
5. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); agree; no citation.
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Commission for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377
U.S. 713 (1964); agree; citation.
7. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); agree; no
citation.
8. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); agree; no citation.
9. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Sailors v. Board of
Education of the County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105 (1967);
disagree; no citation.
10. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); agree; no
citation.
11. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969);
agree; citation.
12. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); agree; no citation.
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13. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); disagree; no citation.
14. Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas
City, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); agree; no citation.
15. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); CVSG; agree;
no citation.
16. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976); disagree; citation.
17. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); disagree;
citation.
18. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); disagree;
citation.
19. Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190 (1978); CVSG; disagree;
citation.
20. Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U.S.
32 (1978); agree; citation.
21. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); disagree;
no citation.
22. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981); agree;
citation.
23. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982); agree; citation.
24. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984); agree; citation.
25. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Commission, 470
U.S. 166 (1985); CVSG; agree; citation.
26. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); CVSG;
disagree; citation.
27. Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988); CVSG; agree; citation.
28. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991); CVSG; agree;
citation.
29. Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491
(1992); disagree; citation.
30. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); agree; no citation.
31. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993); agree;
citation.
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32. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); disagree; citation.
33. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995);
agree; no citation.
34. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186
(1996); agree; citation.
35. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); disagree; citation.
36. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668 (1996); O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,
518 U.S. 712 (1996); agree; no citation.
37. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); disagree;
citation.
38. Foreman v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979 (1997); agree;
no citation.
39. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); agree; citation.
40. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S.
377 (2000); agree; no citation.
41. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); disagree; citation.
42. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); agree; no citation.
43. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); agree; no
citation.
44. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003); agree; citation.
45. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S.
399 (2006); agree; no citation.
46. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181
(2008); agree; no citation.
47. Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008); disagree; citation.
48. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); agree; citation.
49. Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011); disagree; citation.
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